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Morley Gorsky*

An Examination of Some of
the Recent Amendments
to the Ontario Landlord
and Tenant Act

I. Introduction
Ontario's was the first Canadian legislature to attempt to overcome
certain anomalies in the law applicable to residential tenancies.'
The effect of many of the Act's provisions remained uncertain until
*Morley Gorsky, Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario
1. In this article reference to the "Act" is to The Landlordand TenantAct, R.S.O.
1970, c. 236. Reference to the "amended Act"', the "recent amendments to the
Act", or similar combinations of words, refers to S.O. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 13, in
force December 18, 1975. The legislation referred to in the first sentence of the
article is Part IV of the Act, which was enacted by S.O. 1968-69, c. 58, in force on
January 1, 1970. Part IV, which is concerned with residential tenancies, was
enacted after the tabling of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's Interim Report
on Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies (Toronto: Dept.
of Attorney General, 1968) [hereinafter "Interim Report"]. Most of the
recommendations made by the Commission were incorporated in the legislation.
Part IV was amended by S.O. 1972, c. 123, in force June 30, 1972, after the
tabling of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on Review of PartIV,The
LandlordandTenantAct (Toronto: Dept. of Justice, 1972).
The excellent examination of the Act, prior to the most recent amendments, made
by Donald H. L. Lamont, in his Residential Tenancies; The Landlordand Tenant
Act, PartIV (2d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1973), is recommended to those who wish
to gain a greater understanding of the Act up to that time. For a recent interesting
and useful examination of the law affecting residential tenancies, the reader is
referred to V.R. Upans, Ontario Residential Tenancies (Toronto: CCH Canadian
Ltd., 1976), as it is not my intention to deal with all of the changes brought about
by the amended Act, nor to treat those dealt with as a practice guide.
Some of the important changes brought about by the enactment of Part IV and still
in force are:
(a) Abolition of the landlord's right to require or receive a damage security
deposit (s.84(1))
(b) Obligation of a landlord to pay annually his tenant interest on security deposit
for rent at the rate of 6 per cent per year (s.84(2))
(c) Prohibition against a landlord requiring delivery of post-dated cheques or
other negotiable instruments by his tenant (s.85(3))
(d) Regulation of security deposits (damage and rent) held as at January 1, 1970
(s.85)
(e) Remedy of distress abolished (s.86)
(f)

Doctrine of interesse termini abolished (s.87)
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authoritative court decisions were rendered. Would the courts view
the Act as intending to overcome the traditional orientation of
2
landlord and tenant law towards land law doctrine?
(g) Doctrine of frustration of contracts and The FrustratedContracts Act made
applicable to tenancy agreements (s.88)
(h) Distinction between convenants in esse and in posse abolished. For the
purpose of the running of lease convenants, it no longer matters whether "the
things are in existence at the time of the demise" (s.90)
(i) The right of the landlord to arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent to an
assignment, subletting or other parting with possession has been abolished
(s.91(3))
(j) Control of the right to impose charges for giving consent under s.91 (3)
established (s.91(4))
(k) Landlord must mitigate damages upon a tenant's abandoning the rented
premises as in the case of a breach of contract (s.92)
(I)

Contract rules respecting the effect of a breach of a material covenant by one
party on the obligation to perform by the other party made applicable to
tenancy agreements (s.89)

(in) Limits imposed on the landlord's right to enter the rented premises (s.93)

(n) No restriction may be imposed on rights of certain classes of political
canvassers to enter the rented premises (s.94)
(o) No alteration of locking system except by mutual consent (s.95)
Imposition of an obligation on the landlord to provide and maintain
rented premises in a defined state of repair and fitness for habitation
(s.96(l))
(ii) Imposition of an obligation on the tenant for cleanliness of the rented
premises and for certain forms of damage (s.96(2))

(p) (i)

(iii) Summary procedure for enforcing s.96 obligation (s.96(3))
(q) Relief against rent acceleration clauses (s.97)
(r) Prohibition against contracting out of the provisions of Part IV (s.82 (2))
The security of tenure provisions of the recent amendments to the Act would appear
to have been influenced by the British Columbia Landlordand TenantAct, S.B.C.
1974, c. 45, Part III; and the Manitoba Landlordand Tenant Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.
106, as amended by S.M. 1975, c. 37, adding ss. 103 (4), (6), (7) and (12).
2. Although it deals with a commercial tenancy, Highway PropertiesLtd. v. Kelly,
Douglas & Co., [1971] S.C.R. 562; 17 D.L.R. (3d) 710, indicates the willingness
of the Supreme Court of Canada to recognize that a lease is not merely a
conveyance but is also a contract; and that, given the present attitude towards
leasing arrangements, the ascendency of the "estate" element should no longer be
automatically accepted:
There has, however, been some questioning of the persistent ascendancy of a
concept that antedated the development of the law of contracts in English law
and has been transformed in its social and economic aspects by urban living
conditions and by commercial practice [emphasis added]. (at 569; 17 D.L.R.
(3d) at 715)
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Sufficient time has now passed for many of the most important
provisions of the Act to have been adjudicated upon by the superior
courts, and it would be safe to say that the Act usually has been
given a liberal interpretation. Many of the old rules based upon
doctrines of feudal tenure have been held to be superceded by the

statutory rules which are more consistent with developments
associated with contract law. 3 This latter change has been reflected
In M.R. Gorsky, The Landlord and Tenant Act Amendment Act, 1968-69 - Some
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, [1970] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures, Recent
Developments in Real Estate Law (Toronto: DeBoo, 1970) 439, I examined a
variety of possible interpretations which might be forthcoming, with respect to a
number of important sections, once the Act had been in operation for some time.
3. In the recent case of PajelleInvestments Ltd. v. Herbold (1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d)
749 at 755; 7 N.R. 461 (sub nom. Herbold v. Pajelle Investments Ltd.) at 468-69
(S.C.C.), Spence J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, stated his agreement
with the reasons of Schroeder J.A., in delivering the reasons of the Ontario Court
of Appeal ((1975), 4 O.R. (2d) 133 at 138; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 321 at 326). He cited
the following passage from Schroeder J.A.'s judgment:
The recent amendments to the Landlord and Tenant Act have brought about
substantial changes in the relations between landlord and tenant and indeed,
those amendments affect the relations of tenants in large apartment buildings not
only towards each other, but go beyond that and obligate them to exercise a
measure of control over persons who are invited by them to come to the
premises as guests or visitors. The legislation reflects the effort on the part of
legislators to govern and control the standard of social behaviour of inhabitants
of large modem multiple-housing units not only towards their lessors but also
towards each other with a view of promoting peace and tranquility from a social
as well as from an environmental standpoint.
The Pajelle case is also significant in that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted
the ruling of the Court of Appeal that it was within the jurisdiction of the County
Court Judge, who hears an application, made pursuant to section 96(3) of the Act,
to hear a matter of dispute raised by the tenant (the question of an abatement of
rent) that was not alluded to in the tenant's documents filed with the Court prior to
the hearing ((1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 749 at 756; 7 N.R. 461 at 470, referring to 4
O.R. (2d) 133 at 138; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 321 at 326):
It cannot be successfully argued that the granting of such relief was so unrelated
to the principal claim of the tenants made pursuant to the provisions of s.96(3)
(a) that it should be discountenanced on the ground of remoteness.
Spence J. further stated at 757; 7 N.R. at 471, of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada:
I am in agreement with the view expressed in the judgment below that the
learned County Court Judge did possess that power but I feel that he should not
have exercised it unless his determination was based on evidence and only if the
parties have had an opportunity to make representations thereon. In my view,
neither of those prerequisites was present. I am therefore, of the opinion that
this appeal should be allowed only to the extent that it should be referred back to
the County Court of the Judicial District of York so that the proper amount of
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in judgments which accept the Act as remedial in nature and
4
interpret it accordingly.
the abatement of rent may be determined upon a reference unless the parties are
able to arrive at a reasonable settlement.
This aspect of the judgment reinforces the urgent need for addressing the
procedural problems of proof, which will remain no matter how the substantive
rights of the parties are adjusted by the legislation. (Infra at 683-97)
4. In another recent case, Fleischmann v. Grossman Holdings Ltd. (Ont. C.A.)
(delivered May 14, 1976, but as yet unreported), the Court of Appeal, in
interpreting the provisions of section 96(1) of the Act held (at 8) that a tenant has a
cause of action for the negligent breach of the statutory, duty of repair, and "that it
provides therein a standard of care that must be observed by the landlord; that the
breach thereof can be asserted in an action; and that the tenant is not confined to
invoking the procedure outlined in s.96(3)". In so holding, the Court agreed with
the judgment of Holland J. in Cunningham v. Moore, [1973] 1 O.R. 357; 31
D.L.R. (3d) 149 (H.C.). This question had earlier been left open by the Court of
Appeal in the cases of Morrow v. Greenglass (1975), 5 O.R. (2d) 353; 50 D.L.R.
(3d) 337 and McQuestion v. Schneider (1976), 8 O.R. (2d) 249; 57 D.L.R. (3d)
537.
The Fleischmann case is also of interest because it concerned the interesting
question of whether a landlord might indirectly contract out of his "obligations that
flow from his own negligence in complying with the statutory duty [of repair]".
Dubin J.A., at 12, stated that he agreed with the following statement of the County
Court Judge in the judgment under appeal:
To find otherwise would mean, in my view, that the legislature, having imposed
a duty to repair on the landlord under Section 96(1) which it cannot contract out
of by virtue of the provisions of Section 82 (2), would be limiting the tenant to
the remedies set forth in Section 96(3) which would, in my view, place too
narrow an interpretation on Section 96 and create an injustice by virtue of the
statute saying the landlord must repair; it cannot contract out of this obligation
but, if it does so and does so negligently, it can contract out of its liability to pay
the resulting damage. It follows that, if the landlord cannot contract out of its
statutory duty to repair, then it should not be able to contract out of the ensuing
obligation to pay the damages which arise from the failure to repair properly.
The Fleischmann case may, however, be subject to certain limitations. In the case
of Milley v. Hudson, [1971] 3 O.R., part 37, blue page 8; not reported in full, the
Court of Appeal held, in a landlord's claim for rent in the Division Court (now the
Small Claims Court), that the tenant could not set-off the cost of repairs done by
him, relying on section 96(3) (b), and that such relief could only be granted in an
application made pursuant to section 96(3). It is difficult to see why this should be
the case unless it was the opinion of the Court that there was no right known, except
under section 96(3) (b), for a tenant to be able to deduct the cost of repairs from rent
owed. However, see the cases referred to in E. K. Rhodes, ed., Williams'
Canadian Law of Landlord and Tenant (4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1973) at
218-219, from which it would be reasonable to conclude that where the landlord
had an obligation to repair the tenant might, at common law, repair and deduct the
cost from the rent. Taylor v. Beal (1591), Cro. Eliz. 222; 78 E.R. 478; Brown v.
Toronto GeneralHospital Trustees (1893), 23 O.R. 599 (C.A.) (obiter);Tarrabain
v. Ferring, [1917] 2 W.W.R. 381; 35 D.L.R. 632 (Alta. S.C., A.D.), affd
without written reasons (1919), 59 S.C.R. 670; [1918] 2 W.W.R. 172. However,
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Neither landlords' nor tenants' associations were initially very
enthusiastic about the changes brought about by the Act. It became
evident that the procedure for enforcing the provisions of the Act
evoked the major complaints, rather than the matters of substance.
Landlords were unhappy with what they regarded as unreasonable
delays in recovering possession from tenants who had failed to pay
rent or were otherwise in breach of their obligations under the Act or
the tenancy agreement. 5 A second source of dissatisfaction for
landlords was the abolition of the right to a damage security
deposit. 6 Of these two major areas of complaint, more concern was
expressed over the problems surrounding recovery of possession.
While the loss of the power to insist upon payment of a damage
security deposit still remains as a source of complaint, it has ceased
to be a principal grievance. The main concerns of landlords are
associated with enforcing the right to terminate the lease and
recover possession and with the frustrations arising out of the
7
current rent restraint legislation.
Tenants' complaints tended to emphasize matters not dealt with
by the Act, such as the absence of a provision providing for rent
restriction or rent control. Criticism of what the Act had provided
for stressed the difficulty experienced by tenants in enforcing their
newly acquired rights.8 In the latter category were included the
expense of hiring a lawyer and the difficulty in securing the services
of expert witnesses (including securing their cooperation once it was
made known to them that litigation was contemplated or had been
commenced). Expert witnessess are often required in cases
involving the landlord's alleged breach of the statutory duty to
provide and maintain the rented premises in a fit state of repair. 9
as pointed out in Williams, id. at 219, the position is not clear. See United Cigar
Store Ltd. v. Buller (1931), 66 O.L.R. 593; [1931] 2 D.L.R. 144 (S.C., A.D.).
The Act might be amended so as to overcome the possibility of a multiplicity of
proceedings.
5. The statutory provisions referred to, providing for the only means of legally
recovering possession of the rented premises, except for cases where there had been
an abandonment by the tenant, and abolishing self-help, were found in R.S.O.
1970, c. 236, s. 106(1), as amended by S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 3. It is not my
intention to deal with the proceedings for re-entry except as they exist under the
recent amendments. For an examination of the previously applicable procedure, see
Lamont, supra, note 1.
6. See section 84(1)
7. Infra at 683-97
8. Infra at 683-97 and 702-03
9. Section 96(l)
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Low income tenants have complained about the considerable
difficulty encountered in obtaining a certificate under the Ontario
Legal Aid Plan for the purpose of suing or defending a case arising
under the Act. 10
One of the matters which received little attention when the Act
was first enacted was security of tenure. Because any system of
landlord and tenant law which intends to provide meaningful
security of tenure requires some form of rent restriction, and as the
Act made no provision for controlling rents, it is understandable that
security of tenure did not figure greatly in Part IV, either when first
enacted or when it was first amended in 1972.11
Underlying the reforms intended to improve the legal position of
tenants was the assumption that a landlord's fundamental right was
to be paid the rent on time, and that he ought not to be made to
suffer certain kinds of conduct on the part of the tenant, or those for
whom the tenant was responsible, without being able to terminate
the tenancy and recover possession by means of a summary
remedy. 12 Because the landlord remained relatively free to
terminate the tenancy he retained considerable power to behave
arbitrarily. Such a right naturally contributed to the insecurity of the
tenant, who was subject to the whim of his landlord, should the
latter be unwilling to renew a lease. 13 Tenants might be unwilling to
press for the performance of certain obligations, fearing retaliation
by the landlord.
Until rent review mechanisms were established, it was difficult to
10. See The Legal Aid Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, s. 16. Also see S.R. Fodden,
LandlordandTenantLaw Reform (1975), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 441 at 471
11. The Ontario Law Reform Commission, in its Interim Report, supra, note 1 at
64, referred to this fact, citing the experience of rent control during the Second
World War, as outlined in an article by Wishart F. Spence, now Spence J. of the
Supreme Court of Canada, entitled Rental Control in Canada,contained in the first
volume of the 1945 Refresher Course Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada
(Toronto: De Boo, 194 5 )at 295.
12. SeeInterim Report, supra, note 1 at 9
13. Prior to the recent amendments, section 107(2) (now repealed, see infra at
688-89 and note 74) provided limited protection to a tenant, by giving the judge the
authority to refuse to grant an order or writ of possession where it could be shown
that the notice to quit had been given because the tenant had complained to any
governmental authority, because of the landlord's alleged violation of some statute
or municipal by-law concerned with health or safety standards, including a housing
standard by-law, or because the tenant had attempted to secure or enforce his legal
rights. This subsection would only apply in the case of periodic tenancies where a
notice to quit was required. In any event, the onus of proof would usually be
difficult to satisfy.
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fashion effective security of tenure provisions. With the enactment
of The Residential Premises Rent Review Act, 197514 however, it
became possible to amend the Act so as to provide for a form of
security of tenure; for as there cannot be genuine security of tenure
without some controls on rent, there cannot be an effective form of
rent control in the absence of reasonable security of tenure. From
the legislative debates it is evident that the connection did not
escape the attention of the legislature, nor did the anticipated impact
of the termination of the rent restriction provisions on the security of
tenure provisions contained in the amendments to the Act. 15
By far the most significant change effected by the amendments to
the Act is to, in effect, convert tenancies of residential premises
(with minor exceptions which will be noted) into tenancies of an
indeterminate nature which the tenant may terminate on notice but
which the landlord can only terminate for cause (as defined in the
16
Act).
If the amendments to the Act do, in fact, safeguard the essential
rights of the landlord (the rights to be paid the rent reserved when
due, and not to have to suffer certain forms of obnoxious conduct on
the part of the tenant or on the part of those persons for whose
actions the tenant ought to be held responsible) then the imposition
of security of tenure is justified. If the legislature is successful in
identifying the forms of obnoxious conduct which ought to be
proscribed, on pain of the tenant having the tenancy terminated,
then all the landlord will have lost is the right to act capriciously in
terminating a tenancy. A similar diminution of the right to act
capriciously may be noted in consumer law, into which division
landlord and tenant law has been steadily moving as a result of
statutory enactments. There may be some justice in preserving the
right of a small landlord, who rents a few apartments in the house
where he lives, to terminate a tenancy at an appropriate time when
he "cannot get along" with a tenant; and there would appear to be
some public sympathy for such a position. However, a tenant who
lives up to his vital obligations but nevertheless remains subject to
the insecurity of the old law, must inevitably suffer a loss of his
sense of self worth when subjected to the arbitrary conduct of his
landlord. For most tenants there is no longer any real alternative to
14. S.O. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 12, as amended by S.O. 1976, c. 2 and 36
15. Legislature of Ontario Debates, Tuesday, November 25, 1975, Afternoon
Session at 931
16. Infra at 673-83
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living in rented accommodation because of the high cost of
acquiring other forms of interests in land.
While providing the tenant with security of tenure, the legislature
must also provide a reasonable means of recovering possession of
the rented premises in those cases where the vital rights of landlords
have been breached. Tenants must, at the same time, have a realistic
means of presenting their position to an adjudicating tribunal where
a genuine dispute exists.
As long as a system of adjudication does not enable landlords to
obtain possession speedily in a proper case, the Act will have
imposed an unfair burden on them. Similarly, where tenants are
unable to secure reasonable redress, quickly and at reasonable cost,
then the substantive provisions of the Act will lose much of their
impact. Judges who delay unduly in granting to the landlord the
right to regain possession, because of the financial and other
problems of a tenant who has "no place else to go", impose a social
cost on the landlord which more properly belongs with the state.
Unless the provincial or municipal authorities are willing to step in
and accept this cost the legislation will have succeeded only in
undercutting the basic property rights of landlords. 17
Tenants' legal rights ought to be similar to other consumeroriented legal rights; and these are only as meaningful as the
procedures for their realization. Fundamental to a procedural system
are the following: (a) a hearing on the merits within a short time
after commencement of proceedings; (b) availability of trade
witnesses who can be relied upon to accept their responsiblity
seriously; (c) counsel prepared to argue the case, including relevant
points of law, after careful preparation; and (d) reasonable cost. In
the absence of these minimum requirements it is impossible for a
fair system of adjudication to exist. If all that can be guaranteed is
the system of justice which too often prevails in the Small Claims
Courts, which is justified because of the relatively small amounts of
money involved, then the adjudicative system will continue to be
unacceptable.
17. The concerns expressed by landlords over the apparent inability of the
procedure provided by the Act for regaining possession are dealt with in the Ontario
Law Reform Commission's Report on Review of PartIV, supra,note I at 8-14. The
changes effected in the procedures by S.O. 1972, c. 123, did not have any
noticeable effect on landlords' complaints concerning this subject. In this paper, I
have concluded that the changes effected by the recent amendments to the sections
dealing with the procedure for regaining possession are not likely to provide
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It has been claimed that parties to Small Claims actions are
satisfied with the system of adjudication found there. Even if that is
true, there must be a concern for the future of a system of
adjudication which, in many cases, leads to decisions in the absence
of meaningful evidence on the merits, and in the absence of an
appreciation of the relevant law. To tolerate such a system of
adjudication under the Act can only have the effect of subverting the
intention of the legislature.
There are alternatives to the present system of adjudication. But
special tribunals for trying landlord and tenant disputes or new
agencies for administering the Act will not in themselves bring
about improvements, for neither of these approaches necessarily
endeavours to change the fundamental deficiencies of the present
systems. If an attempt is made to remedy the problems referred to, a
8
change in the very nature of the forum may be of some value. 1
Major objections to the introduction of a system which would
attempt to provide remedies capable of meeting the minimum
landlords with much relief from matters which have given rise to their continuing
complaints.
18. During the second reading of the amendments to the Act (supra, note 15) the
Attorney-General, the Honourable Mr. R. McMurtry, Q.C., stated at 936:
In choosing the county courts as the forum that has been provided for by the
amendments, I want to make it clear first that we do not rule out the possibility
that a new forum or court structure may be necessary in the future in order to
deal with the landlord and tenant relationship, which is of course so
fundamental to our society. What we were most concerned about was to provide
a forum that was going to be accessible to tenants and landlords at an early date;
and of course, with the county court structure well in place, this was a
consideration.
Secondly, there is a matter of constitutionality which I did not wish to discuss at
length at this particular point in time, because constitutionally writs of
possession have always been dealt with by courts constituted of federally
appointed judges. This is a matter that has given us some concern,
notwithstanding the fact that we are aware that other provinces have not. I don't
say they have ignored the constitutional issue, but they have not been dissuaded
by it from setting up special landlord and tenant courts.
More important than either of these matters, I think, should be the recognition
of the very important legal relationship that exists between a landlord and tenant
and, as I'm sure was well known by all the members of the Legislature, there is
a very large body of jurisprudence already in existence in relation to the landlord
and tenant relationship. Not just because of that, but considering the very
special legal relationship that will continue regardless of any legislation that is
passed by this Legislature or any Legislature in the future, it's our very strongly
held belief that such a forum should be provided and staffed by people who do
have some special understanding of this legal relationship.
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standards set out above are: (a) that it would be too expensive to
operate; (b) that it would result in the court or other tribunal being
inundated with cases and (c) that it would result in a departure from
traditional values inherent in the adversarial system of justice.
If one accepts the proposition that the administration of justice is
best served where disputes are adjudicated upon by applying the
relevant law to the material facts, then any system of adjudication
which, on the grounds of expediency, accepts a lesser standard,
ought to be rejected. It is often overlooked that the only difference
between a Supreme Court case and one tried by a judge in a Small
Claims Court is the amount of money involved. The issues, both as
to the applicable substantive and adjectival law, may be almost
indentical.' 9 Acceptance of the lower standards of a Small Claims
Court is often based on the amount of money involved. However, it
must be remembered that it is a lesser standard of justice. The
parties know less of the case they have to meet, and face greater
difficulties in dealing with the evidence and the law. What is
retained are some of the trappings associated with court hearings.
In Fodden, supra, note 10 at 473, the author concluded that:
• ..insofar as the reforms aimed at redressing the imbalance in the law (which
had favored the landlord) through the agency of the court, the reformed law has
not achieved its goal. I submit that such failure has occurred in large measure
because of an "over-judicialization" of the law - a heavy reliance was placed
on the courts as effectuators of the law rather than on a more flexible, accessible
administrative body. A tribunal of the latter type, more readily than a court, can
assume an interventionist stance and itself investigate complaints or even act on
its own motion. Courts must assume a reactive posture, placing the onus on
tenants to formulate, press and prove grievances without assistance. Tenants
now do not sue.
The author's statements were based on the results of a study of "files of residential
landlord and tenant cases tried in the County Court of the Judicial District of York"
(id. at 451), with a view to obtaining some insight into the "impact of [the] law
.." (id. at 452).
The data obtained by Fodden does tend to support his conclusion that tenants have
not made effective use of their new rights in the court context.
19. In the case of Smith v. Galin,[1956] O.W.N. 432 (C.A.), MacKay J.A., in
dealing with the jurisdiction of ajudge of the Division Court (now the Small Claims
Court) to disregard general principles of law, stated (at 434):
This statutory provision [now R.S.O. 1970, c. 439, s. 55] that the judge may
make such order or judgment as appears to him just and agreeable to equity and
good conscience does not, in my opinion, entitle the judge to disregard general
principles of law, but may very well be interpreted to clothe the Court with
jurisdiction to disregard technical defects that would defeat the justice of the
claim.
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Being essentially matters of form they cannot overcome the
problems of getting at the substance of the case.
If expediency is to govern the development of a system of
adjudication because the dispute is over a relatively small amount of
money, it cannot be overlooked that many landlord and tenant
disputes concern important property rights. When these property
rights are elevated, by substantive changes, to a secure form of
tenure, it is no longer sufficient to justify maintenance of the lesser
standard of adjudication by relying on the strength of the old
arguments; for important rights, in addition to money, are now
involved.
Because the development of a satisfactory system of adjudication
may result in some departure from traditional ideas of adversary
jurisprudence traditionalists are not likely to be pleased. However,
major changes in the litigation process are presently being
examined. 20 Comparable changes, adapted to the special needs of
the landlord and tenant relationship, should be examined and
implemented where conventional procedures have been found to be
lacking.
Before discussing possible changes in the system of adjudication,
I will examine the nature of the major substantive and procedural
changes which have been made recently to the Act.
II. The PrincipalAmendments
1. Terminationfor Specified Causes Only
The device employed by the amendments to achieve security of
tenure was to restrict the number of grounds for terminating a
tenancy. This will mean that a landlord will no longer be able to
refuse arbitrarily to renew a tenancy for a fixed term or to terminate
a periodic tenancy, in both cases subject to a restricted number of
20. A questionnaire was distributed recently to members of the Law Society of
Upper Canada by a Committee headed by W. Williston, Q.C., to examine the
efficacy of the Ontario Rules of Practice. An examination of the questionnaire
indicates that the Committee is investigating a variety of procedures including
devices which, if accepted, would require a good deal more openness in the
discovery aspects of litigation and in this way effect a considerable alteration in the
adversary system as we know it. It is essential, in endeavouring to preserve the
basic integrity of the existing system of adjudicating civil disputes, that those who
have the ultimate say in what changes are introduced be conscious of the
shortcomings of the system as it affects many ordinary people. No matter how well
the system may function for some, where a major failure in its capacity to serve the
practical needs of others is shown to exist, a reasonable solution must be sought.
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exceptions. In addition, only certain kinds of conduct will enable a
landlord to commence proceedings which could result in the
tenancy being declared terminated and possession recovered.
Section 99(1) (d) requires that a landlord, giving notice of
termination of a tenancy, must,
(i) specify the reasons and particulars respecting the termination,
and (ii) inform the tenant that he need not vacate the premises
pursuant to the notice, but that the landlord may regain
possession by application for a writ of possession to be obtained
from the clerk or judge of the county court, which application the
tenant is entitled to dispute.
Section 99(1)(d)(i) is intended to impose a termination for cause
only provision on the landlord, where the tenancy is of a periodic
nature. Because section 103c., subject to exceptions which will be
noted, provides that "upon the expiration of a tenancy agreement
for a fixed term the landlord and the tenant shall be deemed to have
renewed the tenancy agreement as a monthly tenancy agreement
upon the same terms and conditions as are provided for in the
expired tenancy agreement", it follows that all tenancies, whether
from period to period or for a fixed term, become subject to the
termination for cause only requirement. It is, however, still possible
for the parties to terminate a tenancy without cause or notice by
abandonment (section 98(3)). Periods of notice are set out in
sections 100 (weekly tenancy), 101 (monthly tenancy), 102 (yearly
tenancy), 103 (fixed terms less than a year) and 103 a. (fixed terms
one year or more).
Where termination is to be effected before the end of the tenancy
agreement, cause for termination is restricted to cases where the
tenant:
(a) . . . fails to pay rent in accordance with the tenancy agreement

.. . [in which case notice of termination becomes effective]
• . . not earlier than the twentieth day after notice is given. 2 1
The tenant can avoid the effect of the notice if he pays the rent
demanded within fourteen days of his receiving the notice of
termination. 2 2 Section 103e.(3) requires the notice of termination to
contain a notice to this effect. Failure on the part of the tenant to pay
the rent within the fourteen day period enables the landlord to take
action for termination and possession. 2 3 Notwithstanding the failure
21. Section 103e. (1)
22. Section 103e. (2) and (3)
23. Section 103e. (4)
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to pay the rent, as described, the tenant may obtain a permanent stay
of proceedings, after an application has been brought by the
landlord under section 106, if the arrears of rent and costs of the
24
application are paid into court.
(b) . . . causes or permits undue damage to the rented premises or

its environs and whether by his own wilful or negligent acts or
by those of
a person whom the tenant permits on the residential
25
premises.
(c) at any time during the term of the tenancy exercises or carries
on, or permits to be exercised or carried on, in or upon the
residential premises or any part2 6thereof, any illegal act, trade,
business, occupation or calling.
(d) . . .. [o]r a person permitted in the residential premises by him
[so conduct themselves in a manner] . . . that. . . substantially

interferes with the reasonable enjoyment of the premises
for all
27
usual purposes by the landlord or the other tenants.
(e) [o]r a person permitted in the residential premises by him
through an act or omission in the residential premises or its
environs [seriously impairs] the safety or another bonafide and
lawful right, privilege or interest of any other tenant. .. 28
(f) [permits] the number of persons occupying the residential
premises on a continuing basis [to result] in the contravention of
health or safety29 standards including any housing standards
required by law.
(g) [being] a tenant, of residential premises administered for or on
behalf of the Government of Canada or Ontario or a
municipality or any agency thereof or forming part of a
non-profit, limited dividend housing project financed under the
National Housing Act (Canada) has knowingly and materially
misrepresented his income or that of other members of his
family occupying the residential premises. 3o
In the cases covered in paragraphs (b) to (g), the notice of
termination does not become effective before a date being no earlier
than "the twentieth day after the notice is given" which notice must
specify ".

.

. the act or acts complained of" and state (as the case

may be) that
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

103e. (5)
103f. (1) (a)
103f. (1) (b)
103f. (1) (c)
103f. (1) (d)
103f. (1) (e)
103f. (1) (f)
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• . . the tenant, within seven days . . . pay to the landlord the

reasonable costs of repairing the premises or to make the repairs
to the reasonable satisfaction of the landlord in the cases
mentioned in clause [(b)] or to cease and desist from the activities
in the cases mentioned in clause [(d)] or [(e)] or to reduce the
number of persons occupying the premises in the case mentioned
in paragraph [(f)].1'
In the case of breaches involving damage to the rented "premises
or its environs" the tenant has seven days from receipt of the notice
to pay "the reasonable costs of repairs or [to] make arrangements
satisfactory to the landlord to pay such costs or to make such repairs
to the reasonable satisfaction of the landlord". Compliance by the
32
tenant causes the notice of termination to become void.
In the cases involving disturbance of reasonable enjoyment by
other tenants or the landlord or of impairing the privileges of others,
the tenant must "cease and desist" from the activities mentioned in
those cases within the same seven day period. Compliance by the
33
tenant similarily causes the notice to become void.
In the case of overcrowding there must be a reduction in the
number of persons occupying the premises within the same seven
day period. Compliance by the tenant similarily causes the notice to
34
become void.
Upon failure to pay the rent within fourteen days after service of
the notice or to comply with the terms of the notice served pursuant
to section 103f. (2) within the seven day period after service, or
where the notice is with respect to matters covered by paragraphs (c)
or (g), the landlord may make an application, inter alia, for an order
declaring the tenancy agreement terminated and for a writ of
possession. 35 Thus, the tenant has a means of preventing his
landlord from pursuing the important remedies of termination and
recovery of possession in five of the seven cases by remedying the
breach complained of. Self-help in recovering possession has, by
31. In the case of similar breaches, as are referred to in sections 103f. (1) (a), (c),
(d) and (e), section 19(2) of the Act, applicable to non-residential tenancies,
provides that the "notice specifying the particular breach complained of ... "
where it is capable of remedy, as a condition of proceeding to exercise a right of
re-entry or forfeiture, need only provide a "reasonable time" for remedy and
payment of compensation.
32. Section 103f. (2)
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Section 103e. (4)and section 103f. (3)
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legislation, been abolished and the court-sanctioned procedures for
recovering possession are restricted to cases where cause for
36
termination, as defined in the Act, has been shown to exist.
Because of the special nature of breaches in the nature of
committing an illegal act, carrying on an "illegal trade, business or
calling", misrepresenting income in public housing, no provision is
contained in the amendments which permits the tenant, in such
cases, to remedy the breach and thereby prevent proceedings being
taken for termination and possession.
So as to limit the exercise of the right to preserve the tenancy,
upon remedying the named breaches, 37 the amendments further
provide that where "a notice of termination has become null and
void

. . .

by reason of the tenant complying with the terms of the

notice within the seven days and the tenant within six months
thereafter again contravenes any of the clauses . . . the landlord

may serve on the tenant notice of termination of the tenancy
agreement to be effective not earlier than the fourteenth day after the
notice is given and the landlord is entitled to make application
forthwith" inter aliafor termination and possession. 3 8
Because no grounds exist for regaining possession during the
currency of the tenancy, other, than those listed in the amended Act,
landlords will be limited to an action for damages or for an
injunction, if the tenant commits a prohibited act which does not fall
within the above-listed causes for termination of the tenancy and
recovery of possession. For example, the not unusual clause
prohibiting the keeping of animals in the rented premises would not
be grounds for a section 106 application unless the keeping of the
particular animal resulted in a breach of one of the matters dealt
with in section 103f.(1).
In theory (but only in theory) a default judgment for the relief
provided under section 106 could be obtained within a month after
the day of service of notice of termination. Also, in theory, the
application under section 106 could be heard within a month of the
service of the notice of termination. Problems in obtaining a speedy
adjudication will be discussed in the context of an examination of
the procedure provided for under section 106.39
36.
37.
38.
39.

Section 107(1)
Sections 103f. (1) (a), (c), (d) and (e)
Section 103f. (4)
Infra at 683-97
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It is submitted that the grounds for early termination established
in the amendments are not unfair to either the landlord or the tenant.
It is in their enforcement that fairness will be tested. If it turns out
that in a proper case prompt final adjudication and recovery of
possession is not the rule, then the legitimate complaints of
landlords concerning justice delayed will not have been redressed. It
is also apparent that in leaving emergency situations to be dealt with
by the usual proceedings for an injunction the amended Act has
created, or at least failed to remedy, a serious potential source for
discord and frustration. Any procedure for dealin& with landlord
and tenant disputes is deficient if it fails to provide a summary
avenue for obtaining injunctive relief, both in cases where
possession can be ordered and where injunctive relief would be the
primary remedy being sought.
In addition to the provisions which permit early termination for
cause, a judge may direct the issue of a writ of possession in certain
special situations at the end of the term or period of the tenancy
where:
(a) . . . the landlord bonafide requires possession of the residential
premises for the purpose of occupation by himself, his spouse or
a child or parent of his or 40his spouse, and the landlord has
compiled with section 103 b.
This subsection was enacted in recognition of the landlord's
claim to possession for himself and certain persons closely related to
himself or his spouse.41
Section 103b. permits a tenancy to be terminated, in such case,
upon the giving of "not less than sixty days notice". Termination
will be effected ". . . at the end of (a) the period of the tenancy; or
(b) the term of a tenancy for a fixed term".
Presumably, a judge hearing an application under section 106
would not direct the issue of a writ of possession unless he was
satisfied of the bonafides of the landlord's requirement. It would
also seem that a tenant would have an action against his landlord for
damages caused by a notice being given pursuant to section 103b.
where the possession required was not for the purposes designated.
However, a statute can only accomplish so much and it is inevitable
that some abuses will occur. The alternative was to impose an unfair
40. Section 103g. (3) (a)
41. In the absence of an extended definition, common law spouses would not be
included.
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burden on landlords who genuinely require possession of the
premises for the reasons stated. If a requirement had been imposed
that an affidavit of bona fides be sworn by the landlord, before
serving the notice for the reasons provided for in section 103 g. (3)
(a), there would perhaps have been a reduced likelihood of abuse.
(b) . . . the residential premises in respect of which the notice of

termination was given are administered for or on behalf of the
Government of Canada or Ontario or a municipality or any
agency thereof or form part of a non-profit, limited dividend
housing project financed under the National Housing Act
(Canada) and the tenant has ceased to meet
the qualifications
42
required for occupancy of such premises.
As in the case of rented premises required to house the landlord
and a certain class of relative, this provision was, no doubt,
considered necessary to avoid conflict with recognized needs which
are felt to supercede security of tenure. It is doubtful that such a
provision was necessary in the case of the "Government of Canada
or Ontario" as there is no provision binding the Crown in the right
of the Province of Ontario to the Act and it is doubtful that the
Crown in the right of the Dominion of Canada could be bound by a
43
provincial enactment.
(c) . . . the tenant was an employee of an employer who provided

the tenant with residential premises
during his employment and
44
his employment has terminated.
This subsection recognizes the special case of the tenant who
occupies that position by virtue of his employment and only so long
as his employment continues.
(d) . . . the tenancy arose by virtue of or collateral to a bona fide

agreement of purchase and sale of a proposed unit within the
meaning of The Condominum Act 4 and
the agreement of
5
purchase and sale has been terminated.
Because the tenant, in the circumstances described in this
subsection, is primarily a purchaser of real property, and the status
of tenant is agreed to only for the purpose of permitting early
occupancy of the condominium unit, usually prior to registration of
42. Section 103g. (3) (c)
43. See Gibbs v. CBC, [1953] R.L. 117; Perepelytz v. Departmentof Highways
for Ontario, [1958] S.C.R. 161; 12 D.L.R. (2d) 81, rev'g [1956] O.R. 553; 4
D.L.R. (2d) 8 (sub nom. Perepelytz v. Korah) (C.A.); Gauthier v. R. (1917), 56
S.C.R. 176; 40 D.L.R. 353, affig 15 Ex. C.R. 444; 33 D.L.R. 88
44. Section 103g. (3) (d)
45. Section 103g. (3) (e)
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the unit under The Condominum Act, 46 it is only reasonable to
permit termination of the tenancy agreement should the agreement
of purchase and sale be terminated.
The same right ought to exist in the case of any tenancy which
arises by virtue of or collateral to an agreement of purchase and
sale, and not only one covered by section 103 g. (3) (e). It is not
likely that this would lead to leases artifically being made collateral
to agreements of purchase and sale in order to avoid the restrictions
on the termination of residential tenancies. If such a provision did
lead to such a practice it would be a dangerous one for landlords to
engage in. If the purchase price was reasonable the landlord would
risk losing the property. On the other hand, if the purchase price
was grossly inflated the landlord would risk having a court ruling
that the transaction was intended only as a lease and that in
substance the parties never intended to enter into an agreement of
purchase and sale.
(e) . . where a landlord requires possession of residential
premises for the purposes of:
(a) demolition;
(b) conversion of use for a purpose other than rental residential
premises; or
(c) repairs or renovations so extensive as to require a building
permit and vacant possession of the premises the landlord
may, at any time during the currency of the tenancy
agreement, give notice of termination of the tenancy
agreement, provided that the date of termination specified
shall not be sooner than,
(d) 120 days after the date the notice is given, and
47
(e) the end of the tenancy agreement.
It would appear that sections 103d. (1) (d) and (e) should have
read:
(d) 120 days after the date the notice is given; or
(e) the end of the tenancy agreement whichever is the later
period.
What must have been intended was a period of notice not less
than 120 days. However, the tenancy period was not to be cut short
48
if it had more than 120 days to run when the notice was given.
46. R.S.O. 1970, c. 77
47. Sections 103d. (I) (a), (b)and (c)
48. Thepeculiarlanguage of section 103d. (I) (d), (e) does not appear to have troubled
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In addition to the other possibilities, section 103d. provides the
landlord with a means of getting out of the rental market. No doubt
this provision will be objected to by tenants' representatives as an
obvious means of eroding needed rental stock. From the landlord's
position it would seem to be going beyond the reasonable regulation
of a relationship by forcing him to retain the premises as rental
residential premises. The purpose of the subsection is also to permit
demolition and major repairs or renovations.
Some effort has been made to protect the interests of tenants
when the landlord has given notice under section 103d. (1). Section
103d. (2) provides that the tenant may terminate the tenancy
agreement, where he has received a notice under section 103d. (1):
(a) upon giving the landlord, at least ten days notice in writing4 9
"specifying an earlier date of termination", 5 0 and (b) by paying to
the landlord the "proportionate amount of rent due up to the date of
the earlier termination". 51 Section 103d. (2) (b) further provides
that in the case where the tenant elects to give notice under the
subsection, "the tenant is entitled to take into account the amount of
any security deposit he has paid for rent". This latter provision may
create doubt indirectly as to a tenant's right to take the rent security
deposit into consideration in other cases. For example, where a
tenant has given notice of intention to terminate a tenancy, in other
cases, there would seem to have been no doubt that the tenant could
take the rent security deposit paid into account for the last period of
the tenancy. This is a result of the deposit being only a security that
the rent will be paid. Because section 103d. (2) (b) has mentioned
specifically this right, the question may now arise as to whether it
merely declares an existing right or creates a new one. It might be
argued, on behalf of a landlord, that in the absence of such a right
being granted by statute, it would not exist, as, until the tenant
actually vacates possession, there remains the possibility of
overholding and hence the need and justification for retaining the
deposit remains. Clarification could be accomplished by a simple
amendment.
(f) . . . has persistently failed to pay rent on the date it becomes
due and payable.
Upans, supra, note I at 65. Also, see Regulation 217/16 made under section 16(4) of
the amended Act where the intention of section 103d. (1) is made clear.
49. Section 99
50. Section 103d. (2) (a)
51. Section 103d. (2) (b)
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This provision differs from that found in section 103 e. (1) in that
it is concerned not only with rent in arrears but with a tenant's
persistent habit of making late rental payments. A tenant can avoid
the effect of being in arrears in paying rent by making payment as
above described. 52 Such behaviour can, however, have a day of
reckoning at the end of the term. It is still open to the judge to
relieve against forfeiture in such cases. 5 3 Presumably, the granting
of such relief would be dependent on such matters as the seriousness
of the habit, the degree of tolerance displayed by the landlord and
the extent of the inconvenience imposed by the default on the
landlord.
Of course a landlord faced with a tenant who persistently makes
late rent payment can commence proceedings for payment alone in
the expectation that the imposition of costs will act as a deterrent to
the continuation of the practice.
(g) . . . one or more of the causes for termination of a5 4tenancy
or 103 f. exist.

agreement specified in section 103 e.

Because section 103g. (3) concludes with the words ".

.

. and

the judge shall not consider any cause for termination not
specifically mentioned in this Part", the parties cannot agree upon a
"cause" for termination other than those covered in Part IV.
Experience suggests that expanding the right to add to the "causes"
for termination would lead to landlords insisting on causes which
would render the amendments largely ineffective.
If it is generally accepted that the essential rights of landlords are:
the right to receive the rent when due; protection from tenants who
cause or permit undue damage; protection from tenants who carry
on or permit any illegal acts, trade, business, occupation or calling;
protection from tenants who conduct or permit activities which
interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the landlord or other
tenants; freedom from serious impairment of safety or other bona
fide and lawful right, privilege or interest by some act or omission
of the tenant or person for whom he is responsible; protection from
over-crowding of the rented premises; then, unless other causes are
subsequently found to have been overlooked by the legislature,
there is some justification for prohibiting what amounts to a
contracting out of the limited reasons which will support an
52. Section 103f. (1) (a)
53. Section 106 (1) (g)
54. Section 103e. (1) and Section 103f. (1) (a) - (d)
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application for termination and possession. 55 There are, no doubt,
many activities which, while annoying, would not now be treated as
cause for termination. If adequate procedures were established for
obtaining injunctive relief, such behaviour could be controlled
adequately. For example, the keeping of a dog contrary to the
regulations made part of the tenancy agreement, where the dog does
not commit acts which amount to "cause" for termination, could be
enjoined without placing the lease in jeopardy. Similarly, breach of
such regulations as those concerning the kind of interior and exterior
decoration which is permitted, could be restrained, thus preserving
the rights of the landlord relating to the appearance of the building,
without jeopardizing tenure.
Significantly, the legislation has not enlarged what have
sometimes been referred to as "tenant and tenant" rights. Often the
landlord does not wish to intervene in disputes between his tenants.
In its present form, the landlord alone can act to terminate the
tenancy for breaches under sections 103f. (c) & (d). This would not
be objectionable if a summary remedy for tenant and tenant disputes
was made available for disputes arising under the last mentioned
56
subsection.
2. Adjudication ofDisputes
The amendments to the Act continue the specially designed
procedures for adjudicating questions arising out of the repair and
maintenance obligations imposed by the Act 5 7 and for termination
of the tenancy agreement and associated relief. 58 In the case of
55. Section 82 (1) prohibits contracting out of the provisions of Part IV:
This Part applies to tenancies of residential premises and tenancy agreements
notwithstanding any other Act or Parts I, II or III of this Act and notwithstanding any agreement or waiver to the contrary except as specifically
provided in this Part.
56. The Province of Manitoba has enacted legislation, S.M. 1972, c. 39, s. 3,
amending its Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. 136, by introducing
sections 98 (4) and (5), which enable a landlord, in cases of alleged nuisance or
disturbance by a tenant or person permitted on the premises by the tenant, "of his
own volition, or upon complaint made to him by any person resident in the building
. . . if he is satisfied that the complaint is justified, [to] request

. .

. " that the

nuisance or disturbance be discontinued. If it is not discontinued, an information
may be laid before a magistrate against the offending tenant or person or both. See
M.R. Gorsky, An Examinationand Assessment of the Amendments to the Manitoba
Landlordand TenantAct (Part1) (1972), 5 Man. L.J. 59 at 70-73
57. Section 96
58. Section 106
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section 106, the legislature has made necessary amendments
clarifying the extent of the jurisdiction possessed by the judge, and
in certain significant cases extending that jurisdiction.
Prior to the amendments, proceedings were brought by way of an
application by originating notice of motion (by a landlord) "before
a judge of the county or district court in which the premises are
situate... -59 Through what appears to have been an oversight the
right to make the application was limited to landlords. 6 0 The
amended section provides that a "landlord or a tenant" may "apply
by summary application" and not by "originating notice of
motion". It is not likely that the difference in designation will, by
itself, lead to any change in the way the judges treat the
6
procedure. 1
Section 106, as it previously existed, provided that the
application was "for an order for payment of arrears of rent and
compensation under section 105 and for an order declaring the
tenancy terminated, or any of them". This unfortunately worded
provision was intended to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings where
claims might be made for possession and rent arrears. But could an
application be made pursuant to section 106 for rent arrears alone,
where no issue concerning possession could arise? The difficulty
presented by permitting a claim for arrears of rent alone was that it
would oblige a tenant, in such cases, to pay the rent arrears into
court as the price of being permitted to raise a defence based on
breaches of convenant by the landlord. In the case of Re Sam
Richman Investments (London Ltd.) and Riedel, 6 2 Houlden J.,
delivenng the judgment of the Divisional Court, held that the
59. S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 3, repealing s. 106 and substituting a new s. 106
60. Id.
61. However, see the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Re Herbold & Pajelle
Investments Ltd. (1975), 4 0.R. (2d) 133 at 135-36; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 321 at 322-3,
where Schroeder J.A. referred to the provisions of the Consolidated Rules of
Practice, R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 554, r. I1(1) and (2):
Where by any statute a summary application without the institution of an action
may be made to the court or a judge in a manner therein provided, such
application may also be made by originating notice but any security required by
such statute shall be given.
Schedule (2) of that Rule makes it applicable:
(2) . . . to proceedings which by any statute or rule may be taken in a county
court or before a judge od a county court.
62. (1975),60.R. (2d)335;52D.L.R. (3d) 655 (H.C.)
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section only permitted a claim for arrears of rent where the tenant
could be considered to be overholding. The Act has now been
63
clarified to reflect this judgment.
Under the amended Act, the powers of the judge have been
expanded so as to permit the making of an order for the ".

.

. return

of a security deposit and interest thereon", thus enabling a tenant to
avoid the difficulty of having to proceed before a Provincial Court
Judge pursuant to section 108 (1) to obtain a conviction for
contravention of the provisions of section 84 or section 85, or by
way of an action in a Small Claims Court. 6 4 In the case of the
quasi-criminalproceeding, the onus would be the same as in the
usual criminal case. In the case of a proceeding in a Small Claims
Court, the difficulty has been the time lag before the trial date and
the often considerable wait before the case is heard on the trial date.
Section 106(1) (e) specifies that the judge may order an
65
"abatement of rent". Although section 106, as originally enacted,
did not provide specifically for such relief, the amendment made in
197266 clarified the right to such relief and many judges have so
interpreted the section. 67

In the case of Saini Enterprises Ltd. v. Cambridge Leaseholds
Ltd.,68 it was held that in the case of proceedings for possession
63. Section 106(2) and section 106(3)
64. Section 106(1) (e)
65. S.O. 1968-69, c. 58, s. 105
66. S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 3, repealing R.S.O. 1960, c. 236, s. 106 and substituting
s. 106, which by s. 106(4) indicated by inference that a claim for breach of a
landlord's convenants could be raised by a tenant in a landlord's application for rent
or compensation under section 105.
67. In the case of.Re VictoriaPark Community Homes Inc. and Buzza (1976), 10
O.R. 2d 251 (Co. Ct.), Stayshyn Co. Ct. J. (at 254) permitted a defence based
upon breaches of section 96(1) by the landlord "in the interest of avoiding a
multiplicity of proceedings, and having all matters in dispute before the presiding
judge determined at the same time

. .

.". Judge Stayshyn disagreed with Cornish

Co. Ct. J. in Re PajelleInvestments Ltd. and Booth (No. 2) (1975), 7 O.R. (2d)
229 (Co. Ct.) who would restrict claims for abatement of rent to applications under
section 96.
68. Saini EnterprisesLtd. v. Cambridge Leaseholds Ltd. (1973), 5 N.B.R. (2d)
704; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 416 (S.C., A.D.). The Saini case is of interest because it
follows the earlier Ontario judgment of Re J.B. JacksonLtd. and Gettas (1926), 58
O.L.R. 564; [1926] 2 D.L.R. 721 (A.D.) where Middleton J.A. stated, at 573;
[1926] 2 D.L.R. at 729:
The County Court Judge has assumed that the right to relieve from forfeiture is a
right which has been conferred upon him. Under the Statute as it now stands,
the Court can alone grant relief. The County Court Judge, acting under Part III
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before a judge as persona designata, there was no jurisdiction to
grant relief against forfeiture "on such terms and conditions as the
judge may decide", unless it was clear from the legislation that such
jurisdiction was vested in the judge. Section 106 (1) (g) now gives
the judge power to relieve against forfeiture.
It would seem that this jurisdiction will be exercised in much the
same way as in the case of the summary proceedings for regaining
possession in the case of non-residential tenancies. 69 This is subject
[the summary procedures for possession still applicable to non-residential
tenancies, and then applicable to all tenancies] is not a "court" but a mere
personadesignata.
The jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under Part III of the Ontario
Landlord and TenantAct was conferred by amendment made in the revision of the
statutes in 1927. "See s. 4 of an Act to provide for the Consolidation of the Statutes
of Ontario, assented to on the 5th day of April 1927, found at p. xxvi of the first
volume of R.S.O. 1927, and the proclamation, p. cxcix of Vol. 4" now found as
section 19 (1) (a) of the Act. See Glaser v. Kirsh (1929-30), 37 O.W.N. 45 at 46
(C.A.). As no similar amendment had been made to the New Brunswick Landlord
and Tenant Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 126, s. 14(2), the Court of Appeal held that a
County Court Judge, assuming jurisdiction under Part III of the New Brunswick
Act, similarily had no jurisdiction, as persona designata, to relieve against
forfeiture for breach of a lease.
Prior to the recent amendments to the Ontario Act, the only provision which might
have supported an argument in favour of permitting a judge to relieve against
forfeiture was section 106 (10). The latter subsection provided that:
The judge may order that the enforcement of the writ of possession be
postponed for a period not exceeding oneweek and such other relief as may be
equitable in the circumstances.
Certainly the power to relieve against forfeiture provided for in section 20 (1) of the
Act would not have applied to proceedings brought pursuant to section 106.
In Fodden, supra, note 10 at 463, the figures cited disclose that relief against
forfeiture was regularly granted in section 106 applications. Because the provisions
of section 96(3) specifically provided for relief against forfeiture in the case of
enforcement of the repair and cleanliness obligations, it might have been argued
that the words "equitable in the circumstances" in section 106(10) do not include
the granting of relief against forfeiture. That judges assumed they did have
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture may be an example of the "palm tree
justice" referred to in A. Weinrib, The OntarioLandlord and Tenant Amendment
Act (1971), 21 U. Toronto L.J. 92 at 95 where the author conjectured as to how
section 96(3) might be interpreted.
See the Victoria Park case, (1976), 10 O.R. (2d) 251 at 256. The judge referred to
The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, s. 22, as a basis for relieving against
forfeiture. However, the power there conferred is on the Court and not upon a judge
personadesignata. And see Bendjy v. Munton, [1932] O.R. 123; [1932] 1 D.L.R.
534 (C.A.)
69. SeeRe Jeans West Unisex Ltd. and Hung (1976), 9 O.R. (2d) 390; 60D.L.R.
(3d) 446 (H.C.)
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to differences brought about by the restriction in the granting of
such relief in certain specified cases of non-residential tenancies.
However, it is unlikely that relief against forfeiture will be granted a
tenant who has been served with a notice of termination for breach
of sections 103f. (1) (b) and (f). In such cases, it is difficult to see
how relief against forfeiture could be granted.
As a "paper" remedy, section 106(1) provides for a hearing
within a reasonable period. Section 106(4) provides for "4 clear
days notice before the day for the return of the motion". Section
106(10) provides for a hearing "forthwith or at such time and place
as the judge may appoint". A system of landlord and tenant law
which is to gain acceptance by the parties must insure a hearing
without lengthy delays. Frustrations, brought about by delays in
obtaining relief, can become a source of undermining the purposes
of the Act. What social value is served by requiring a landlord, with
a valid claim, to wait for many months while the tenant remains in
the premises without paying rent? Section 106(6) provides some
relief against the tenant who defends merely as a means of delaying
the hearing.
No dispute to a claim for arrears of rent or compensation under
section 105 may be made by the tenant under subsection 5 on the
grounds that the landlord is in breach of an express or implied
convenant unless the tenant has first paid to the clerk of the court
the amount of the rent and compensation claimed to be in arrears
less,
(a) amounts paid by the tenant for which he alleges he is entitled
to set-off under clause (b) of subsection 3 of section 96, as
substantiated by receipts filed; and
(b) amounts of rent and compensation alleged by the tenant by
his dispute to have been paid as substantiated by receipts
filed or verified by affidavit.
It has not yet been decided whether "implied covenant" would
include a statutory obligation in the nature of a covenant imported
70
into or implied in the tenancy agreement.
Unfortunately, section 106(6) does not take into consideration
rent which accrues due after the amounts there provided for have
been paid to the clerk. In the event of a considerable delay before
judgment is given, the landlord could suffer a loss which might be
avoided if provision had been made for requiring rent, accruing due
70. See Upans, supra, note I at 76 where the author would appear to take a
different position.
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after commencement of the proceedings, to be paid to the clerk until
judgment. It must be recalled that if the tenant prevails he will not
lose the money. If the landlord is successful, however, given the
recent legislation, he may never recover what is owed to him.
Additional losses may be suffered by landlords where the judge
delays his consent to a writ of possession being issued and where
there are further delays in enforcement. Delays in enforcement have
often been encountered because of concern for the welfare of
tenants. Unless there are changes in the law, landlords will continue
to be made the agency of the state to furnish free rental
accommodation to impecunious tenants. The amendments have
done nothing to address this problem. It would appear that,
indirectly, the increased costs suffered by landlords could be passed
on to the landlord's other tenants in a rental market characterized by
low vacancy rates.
Delays in obtaining redress can also result from:
(a) The time lag between the hearing of the application and the
making of the appropriate order.
(b) The imposition of "terms and conditions as the judge considers
appropriate" to the enforcement of a writ of possession.71
Some restraint is imposed by section 107 (2) (b) of the amended Act
which permits postponement for up to one week for the enforcement
of the writ of possession. However, what judge would not delay
enforcement of the writ of possession where it was shown that the
tenant and his family had no place to go? Almost all people would
accept the need to prevent this hardship, especially where young
children are involved. What is not agreed upon is who should bear
the cost of preventing the hardship caused when a tenant ceases to
be entitled to retain occupancy of the rented premises. At present, it
is likely that it will be the landlord, or his other tenants, who will
bear the cost. Such a result seems inevitable given the language of
the Act which was introduced in 1972.72
Although section 107(2) (b) provides for the judge postponing the
enforcement of the writ of possession "for a period not exceeding
one week", section 107(2) (a) provides that the judge may "refuse
to grant the application unless he is satisfied, having regard to all the
circumstances, that it would be unfair to do so
71. Section 106(11)
72. S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 3, adding s. 106(10)

. . .".

It would
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therefore appear that the writ of possession will not issue as a matter
of course. This provision may become a source of difficulty if the
word "unfair" is treated as providing a basis for dealing with
hardship cases. It is unlikely that this was the intention of the
legislature, as section 107(3) provides a list of reasons for a judge
refusing to grant the application.
This list, which is not to "restrict the generality of subsection 2",
of section 107, nevertheless, does not cover hardship cases, with the
possible exception of section 107(3) (e):
a reason for the application being brought is that the
premises are occupied by children, provided that the occupation
by the children does not constitute overcrowding and the
premises are suitable for children.
Section 107(2) (a) would seem to be restricted to cases where the
landlord's action was prompted by non-business reasons, such as a
desire to subvert the reliance by tenants on the protection afforded
by the Act. Section 107(3) (e), however, arguably represents a
"hardship" case, as many families experience greater difficulty in
obtaining rental accommodation because they have children.
Section 107(3) (e) might not be viewed as being concerned with a
hardship case: it deals primarily with a situation where the landlord
is not genuinely acting to get rid of a tenant who is in breach of a
provision which furnishes a permitted basis for obtaining a writ of
possession, but where the real reason for the landlord's action is the
presence of children. "Unfair", as used in section 107(2) (a),
would therefore incorporate other reasons for refusing to grant a
writ of possession where the landlord's motivation for seeking the
writ was based on legally irrelevant motives and not on one of the
permitted reasons.
Section 107(3) may have considerable practical effect in a case
where a tenant is in breach of any of the provisions of the Act which
would serve as a basis for termination of the tenancy and obtaining
possession, and the landlord is in breach of the former section. A
not dissimilar situation is encountered in the cases under The
Labour Relations Act 73 where the alleged valid reason of
management for dismissing an employee is intertwined with a
74
prohibited reason, such as the employee's union activity.
73. R.S.O. 1970, c. 232
74. See R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 79. See Local 2345 InternationalBrotherhoodof
Electrical Workers, AFL CIO CLC, (Complainant) v. Onward Manufacturing
Company Limited, (Respondent), 11976] OLRB Rep. 71. This case was brought
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under section 79 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, in which the complainant
alleged that the grievors had inter alia been discharged because of their union
activity, or because they were members of a trade union or were exercising their
rights under the Labour RelationsAct.
At 75 of the Decision of the Board, it is stated:
The Board has long held that in complaints such as this, anti-union motivation
does not have to be the sole reason or even the predominant reason for the
activity complained of for the Board to find that the Act has been breached. A
recent decision of the Ontario High Court in considering the comparable section
of the Canada Labour Code upheld this interpretation.
"In considering an enactment devoid of the words, "sole reason", or "for the
reason only" and resting only on the word "because", the Court must take an
expanded view of its application. If the evidence satisfies it beyond a
reasonable doubt that membership in a trade union was present to the mind of
the employer in his decision to dismiss, either as a main reason or one
incidental to it, or as one of many reasons regardless of priority, s. 110(3) of
the Canada Labour Code has been transgressed."
See the Bushnell case (1974) 1 O.R. (2d) at page 442. This decision was upheld
in a decision of the Court of Appeal dated April 4, 1974 and found at 4 O.R.
(2d) 288.
In proceedings of this type the Board does not have the authority to make a
determination with respect to the fairness of the actions taken by the respondent.
Rather, the question before the Board with respect to each of these terminations
is whether or not the respondent was motivated by anti-union sentiment. The
Board referred to the reversal of the onus in the Barrie Examiner case (1975)
OLRB October 6, 1975 wherein the Board stated:
"Given the requirement that there be absolutely no anti-union motive, the
effect of the reversal of the onus of proof is to require the employer to establish
two fundamental facts - first, that the reasons given for the discharge are the
only reasons and, second, that these reasons are not tainted by any anti-union
motive. Both elements must be established on the balance of probabilities in
order for the employer to establish that no violation of the Act has occurred."
It may be that section 107(3) will have the effect of placing a greater burden on the
landlord of demonstrating his entitlement to a writ of possession, because "...
the judge shall refuse to grant the application [for the writ of possession] where he
is satisfied that:
(a) the landlord is in breach of his responsibilities under this Act or of any
material covenant in the tenancy agreement;
(b) a reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has complained
to any governmental authority of the landlord's violation of any statute or
municipal by-law dealing with health or safety standards including any housing
standard or by-law;
(c) a reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has attempted to
secure or enforce his legal rights;
(d) a reason for the application being brought is that the tenant is a member of an
association, the primary purpose of which is to secure or enforce legal rights of
tenants, or that the tenant is attempting to organize such an association; or
(e) a reason for the application being brought is that the premises are occupied

Recent Amendments to the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Legislation 691

Section 106(8) provides the means of setting aside a default
judgment upon an ex parte motion made within seven days of the
order. Where the judge is satisfied on "reasonable grounds" that a
dispute exists an order may be granted. Section 106(9) provides for
a judge extending the time for bringing the application "upon being
satisfied that a proper case has been made for so doing". If
provision had been made for safeguarding the landlord's claim for
rent, as suggested above, the delays resulting from such orders
would not impose an undue hardship. Section 106c. (2) ensures that
where a tenant takes an appeal to the Divisional Court from a final
order under Part IV, the tenant must pay "additional rent or
compensation accruing to the date of filing of the notice" of appeal.
This subsection recognizes the need to protect the landlord against
loss of rent pending recovery of possession, but, as in the case of
section 106(6) does so imperfectly.
In a case where two applications have been brought, one under
section 106 and one under section 96 or section 114, because the
issues in the two applications are often inter-related, as where the
landlord proceeds under section 106 for arrears of rent and
possession and the tenant relies on a breach of the landlord's repair
and maintenance obligations under section 96, the amended Act
now provides for the judge fixing a common hearing date to hear all
75
matters in issue between the parties.
There was an attempt in the amended Act to make the
proceedings under Part IV less formal. Thus, section 106(e) (1)
permits "a party to an application under this Part [to] be represented
by counsel or an agent". This change was, no doubt, prompted by a
desire to reduce the legal expenses of pursuing rights under the Act,
as well as to make it easier to secure "legal" assistance.
Landlord and tenant litigation cannot be treated as simple and
uncomplicated. Take the example of a relatively "uncomplicated"
proceeding against a tenant who intends to rely, in his dispute, upon
the alleged failure of the landlord to carry out his repair and
by children, provided that the occupation by the children does not constitute
overcrowding and the premises are suitable for children.
It would therefore appear irrelevant that there are other valid reasons for the
application being made. This provision (s.107 (3)) may lead to a considerable
number of problems where the tenant has provided an ample justification for a
landlord's application for possession but the landlord is found to have breached any
of the provisions of section 107(3). It would have been better to give the judge
discretion to refuse the application bearing in mind "all of the circumstances".
75. Section 106(12). The provisions of section 114 will be discussed infra at 702
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maintenance obligations. The lawyer for either party, if he is to
represent his client adequately, should spend time to acquaint
himself with the nature of the claim, which would include an
attendance upon his client to discuss the matter and receive
instructions. Following the meeting, the nature and content of the
interview might be dictated and transcribed and the transcription
reviewed. If there is a possibility of settlement this would normally
have to be pursued. Where the dispute arose out of certain breaches
of the repair and fitness obligations contained in the Act, it would be
necessary to have the details investigated by competent trade
witnesses. Their reports would have to be obtained and examined.
Prudence dictates that they should be interviewed in preparation for
the hearing and their anticipated evidence recorded and reviewed
with them. The various court documents would have to be prepared,
reviewed and filed. Payment might have to be made in compliance
with section 106(6). Prior to the hearing, careful counsel would
attend upon the client in order to review the evidence in preparation
for the hearing. If successful, the necessary order would have to be
prepared and arrangements made for execution and entry. Finally,
proceedings might also be necessary to obtain payment of the
moneys out of court. 76 For the landlord it might be necessary, upon
obtaining a writ of possession, to insure that it was enforced by the
sheriff.
It is unnecessary to comment on the ways in which certain of the
matters described might not be pursued except to say that failure to
do so would have only one justification: expediency. That is, the
financial implications of the issue are considered to be of
insufficient importance so as to warrant the expenditures called for.
This, however, misses the point. The issue is the right to a real
hearing of a vital issue: the right to a secure tenancy of premises,
reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were intended.
Similarily, the landlord should not, where he has fulfilled his
obligations, be deprived of his rent or possession of the premises.
On occasion, articled clerks are given the conduct of proceedings
under Part IV, thus effecting a saving in fees. However, to the
extent that they do not take the steps described above in preparation
for the hearing, they will be prepared imperfectly. Counsel who is
not certain what his client or trade witness will say in support of
what he believes to be the case for his client, and who has not
76. Section 106d.
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prepared a brief on the applicable law, will be prepared
inadequately. Yet, there is no simple way to get around the limit of
most clients' willingness or ability to incur legal expenses for the
legal services described. It is no secret that legal aid certificates are
not granted very easily in landlord and tenant proceedings. Often,
this is not because of matters related to the merits of the case, but
because of the policy which appears to affect area directors. Recent
pronouncements of the Attorney-General for Ontario indicate an
77
ever more restrictive policy in issuing legal aid certificates.
Representation by agents may present a partial solution to the
difficulty in obtaining legal aid certificates. Unless they are trained
to perform the functions described, the situation will in no
meaningful way have been improved. Section 106e. (2) indicates
that agents, other than members of the Ontario Bar, will be
excluded where the judge finds them "not competent [to] properly
represent [their client]" or "[where they do] not understand and
comply at the hearing with the duties and responsibilities of an
advocate or adviser". What about the barrister who appears to the
judge to be incompetent? To be effective, the reform will, in some
way, have to lead to the creation of a significant group of qualified
agents. Such a situation can only result from the establishment of a
training programme. I do not overlook the role which might now be
played by student legal aid societies if changes in the Legal Aid
78
Regulations are forthcoming.
Will law firms perform this function? If not, will some other
establishment undertake to do so? Will an agent be able to function
except as an employee of a barrister and solicitor entitled to practise
in Ontario? If the business of agent in small claims cases represents
a legal undertaking, why should an agent representing a person
79
pursuant to section 106e. (1) be treated differently?
77. See Globe & Mail (Toronto), February 14, 1976
78. In this regard, see Fodden, supra, note 10 at 470. Although section 106 e.(l)
now permits representation by an agent, in order to permit law students associated
with Student Legal Aid Societies to act as agents under section 106e.(1), there will
have to be an amendment to the regulations made pursuant to The Legal Aid Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 239. At present, jurisdiction of students who are members of
Student Legal Aid Societies does not include appearances under the procedures
provided for in the Act, See R.R.O. 1970. Reg. 557, rr. 74-78, as amended
79. See The Small Claims CourtAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 439, s. 100, and also see
C.F. McKeon, Small Claims Court Handbook (3d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1975) at
79. However, see The Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 441, s. 1, which places an
apparent restriction on the charging of fees in such cases.
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Because judges have felt themselves bound by accepted rules of
evidence in adjudicating landlord and tenant disputes, the
proceedings often become less summary, more technical and more
expensive. With the introduction of the right to be represented by
agents, the legislature has opened up the possibility of a party being
represented at lower cost. Experience in Small Claims Courts,
where non-lawyers may appear as agents, would indicate that with
adequate training and experience, agents will provide a useful
alternative means of obtaining representation.
With a view to making the summary proceedings less subject to
criticism, because of the retention of the rules of evidence which
apply in the courts, and which tend to place the party without a
lawyer at a disadvantage, section 106 g. (1) was enacted:
Subject to subsections 2 and 3, a judge of the county or district
court may admit as evidence at a hearing under this Part, whether
or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or admissible as
evidence in a court,
(a) any oral testimony; and
(b) any document or other thing,
relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings and may act on
such evidence, but the judge may exclude anything unduly
repetitious.
Hearsay evidence may therefore be received and acted upon. This
change is not very startling, and in any event, it is not likely that
judges will admit all hearsay evidence.
Section 106g. (2) restricts the discretion of the judge by making
inadmissible in evidence at a hearing anything that would be
"inadmissible in a court by reason of any privilege under the law of
evidence; or. .. that is inadmissible by statute".
Section 106g. (3) prevents section 106 g. (1) from overriding the
provisions of "any Act expressly limiting the extent to or purposes
for which any oral testimony, documents or things may be admitted
or used in evidence in any proceedings".
Section 106g. (4) permits copies of documents or other things to
be admitted as evidence, where the "judge is satisfied as to their
authenticity".
In order to overcome difficulties encountered, where the original
documentary evidence filed as evidence is required to be left with
the judge, section 106 g. (5) permits a photocopy to be made and
used in place of the documents filed and released. Alternatively, the
photocopy certified by the judge may be released. In disputes
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involving business records, it would often cause great inconvenience if an entire series of records had to be left with the judge
merely because some of the contents were required for the purpose
of the hearing. Section 106g. (6) enables
[a] document purporting to be a copy of a document filed in
evidence at a hearing, certified to be a true copy thereof by the
judge, .

.

. [to be] admissible in evidence in proceedings in

which the document is admissible as evidence of the document.
Where there is no real dispute concerning evidence which would
normally be admissible on the grounds that it is hearsay, section
106 g. may prove of some benefit. However, where the opposite
party is prepared to tender direct evidence to contradict the hearsay
evidence, the result will often be the same as before the amendment.
Where the issue, for example, is whether the landlord has been in
breach of his obligation to repair, it might prove to be of little value
to a party to be able to enter hearsay evidence, if the opposite party
80
has a trade witness in court prepared to give direct evidence.
Understandably, tradespersons are not anxious to suffer the
inconvenience of having to appear in court as witnesses. In case of a
serious contest, an uncooperative trade witness represents a
considerable detriment to a party's case. Where a trade witness is
bound by an ongoing commercial relationship (such as often exists
with landlords) he is more likely to be agreeable to preparing a
complete report of the situation presented to him, after making a
proper investigation. He is also more likely to be agreeable to
attending on the party's lawyer so that the preparation of that party's
case will be based on the lawyer's being sufficiently familiar with
the trade witness's testimony.
Insurance companies have recognized agreements with expert
witnesses, such as doctors, who appear regularly in court to testify
in cases involving the interest of the companies. It would therefore
be possible for landlords' or tenants' organizations to make such
arrangements on behalf of their members. 81
80. See Re OntarioHousing Corporation& Dingle, [1972] 3 O.R. 123 (Co. Ct.),
where the judge stated that while a party does not have to adduce oral evidence, and
chooses to tender affidavit evidence which is challenged by oral evidence, the oral
evidence will usually prevail unless it is discredited and disbelieved. The
procedures provided for under section 106 permit viva voce testimony. Also, seeRe
Pajelle Investments Ltd. and Booth (1975), 6 O.R. (2d) 181 at 184 (Div. Ct.)
81. There is a relatively unexplored role for tenants' organizations. Given the large
number of tenants in Ontario, if small payments could be obtained from the
membership, the funds collected could be used for retaining expert witnesses and as
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In cases where more than one tenant "has a common interest in
respect of an application under [Part IV] one or more of those
persons may be authorized by a judge of the county or district court
in which the premises are located to make or defend an application
on behalf of, or for the benefit of all". 82 It may now become
possible, because of the numbers involved in certain cases, for
tenants to be able to afford the services of experts where the cost
might have been beyond the resources of a single tenant. It will first
be necessary to see how the courts interpret this interesting "class
action" provision. What is a "common interest"? It would seem
that, in context, the provision is intended to avoid a multiplicity of
proceedings. For example, it might apply where the proceeding
concerns failure of the landlord to repair common areas such as the
stairways, parking lot or laundry room. It is difficult to see how
"common interest" could be extended to cover claims related to
individual rented premises. 83 A reduction in the number of hearings
might be achieved by enabling the applications of a number of
tenants in the same building involving similar issues to be heard at
the same time. In this way, a trade witness, who is required to
testify about more than one rental premises, could do so at one time.
The state of repair of one of the apartment units in a building may
give rise to similar questions affecting the state of repair of other
units. The condition in one of the rented premises may turn out to be
markedly different from the others, and there might be special
significance in this fact which could be overlooked if each case was
heard separately. In such cases there is also the greater possibility of
inconsistent orders being made. Even in the absence of such a
provision there is no reason that the evidence could not be given as
described above, if the judge was of the opinion that it would be fair
well for financing test cases to the appeal court level. There has been a reasonable
elaboration of the Act by the courts. But the tendency towards fuller elaboration
would be accelerated if a means were available for litigating test cases. It would
appear that the use of tenant (or for that matter, landlord) associations as a vehicle
for financing cases would not amount to illegal maintenance and would represent a
salutory influence in the development of the law. Too often, confusion arises
because of the lack of guidance available to country court judges.
I appreciate that Fodden, supra, note 10 at 450, concluded that the courts had not,
to the date of his article, done much to elaborate the extent of tenants' rights under
the Act. Certainly, since that time, although the volume of reported cases has not
been great, the nature and extent of some of the most important provisions of the
Act have been further clarified. Supra, notes 3, 4
82. Section 106f.
83. See Upans, supra, note 1 at 77-78
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to do so in all the circumstances, and counsel for the several tenants
84
were agreeable.
3. Withholding orInterfering with the Supply of Services
Because landlords may no longer resort legally to self-help in
retaking possession of the rented premises, section 107 of the Act
was amended to prohibit a landlord from withholding "supply of
any vital service such as heat, fuel, electricity, gas, water or other
vital service, that it is his obligation to supply under the tenancy
agreement during the tenant's occupation and until the date on
which a writ of possession is executed". 85 It was thus intended to
prevent the circumventing of the provision prohibiting resort to
self-help. Section 107(4) (a) of the recent amendments has added to
the obligations of the landlord in providing that he should not
"deliberately interfere with the supply of any such vital service
whether or not it is his obligation to supply such service".
The previous provision made it incumbent on a landlord to
furnish the "vital services" referred to even where the tenant was,
for example, in arrears of rent. 86 In the absence of such a provision
the landlord could argue that he was, in such circumstances, no
longer obligated to supply heat, fuel, electricity, etc. Where the
furnishing of a vital service was not the landlord's responsibility, he
would have no obligation to do so at common law or by statute.
What the recent amendment apparently intends is to restrict the
landlord's power of shutting off a main valve or panel so as to
prevent receipt of a vital service by the tenant, which service the
landlord is not obliged to supply pursuant to the tenancy agreement.
There is a significant difference between discontinuing a service
which the landlord was bound to furnish and interfering with the
supply of such service which the landlord had no obligation to
furnish. The amended Act creates an additional means of enforcing
the prohibition. 87
Section 107(4) (b) supports the intention of section 107(1), which
latter subsection restricts the landlord's recovery of possession of
84. As to problems which may be encountered in endeavouring to have the cases
tried at the same time, see Re PajelleInvestments Ltd. andBooth (No. 2) (1975), 7
O.R. (2d) 229 at 232-33
85. S.O. 1972, c. 123, s. 4(2), amending R.S.O. 1970, c. 236, by adding s.
107(3)
86. Id.
87. Section 108(1), See infra, note 90
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the rental premises to cases where the tenant has vacated or
abandoned the rented premises or where possession is regained by
authority of a writ of possession. Section 107(4) (b) is intended to
prohibit conduct engaged in for the purpose of causing the tenant to
give up possession of the rented premises. Because sectionl07 (4)
(b) only prohibits acts which "substantially interfere with the
reasonable enjoyment of the premises for all usual purposes by a
tenant or members of his household . . .", does this mean that acts
of interference which are insubstantial will be tolerated, even where
they interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the premises for all
usual purposes? A situation might arise where the landlord
interferes substantially with the reasonable enjoyment of the
premises for all usual purposes, of a member of the tenant's
household, with a view to causing that person to give up possession
of the premises, and such conduct would not be prohibited by
section 107 (4) (b).
Section 107 (4) (b) also covers cases where the acts complained
of are intended to cause the tenant "to refrain from asserting any of
the rights provided by the Act, or. . . by the tenancy agreement".
4. PenaltyProvisions
Section 108 of the Act creates a number of offences punishable on
summary conviction. The maximum fine upon conviction has been
increased by the recent amendments from $1,000 to $2,000. As
well as the increase in the maximum fine, contravention of certain
additional sections of the Act have been created as offences. Prior to
the amendments, section 10888 created offences of: (a) knowingly
contravening the provisions of section 84 (the landlord (i) requiring
or receiving a damage security deposit; (ii) failing to pay interest on
a permitted rent security deposit not exceeding one month's rent; or
(iii) requiring delivery of any post-dated cheque or other negotiable
instrument to be used for payment of rent); (b) section 85 (a section
applying to security deposits held by landlords on January 1, 1970,
which may be retained subject to (i) payment of interest annually at
the rate of six per cent per year; (ii) repayment to the tenant,
together with accrued interest, within fifteen days of the tenancy
being terminated or renewed; subject to an extension of time being
ordered on summary application to a judge of the County or District
Court of the county or district in which the premises are situated.
88. R.S.O. 1970, c. 107, s. 107, as amended by S.O. 1972, c.

12

3, s. 5
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Where a landlord "proposes to retain any amount of the security
deposit", he must "so notify the tenant together with the particulars
of and grounds for the retention and he shall not retain such amount
unless" he obtains the written consent of the tenant after receipt of
the notice, or he obtains an order from the judge); (c) section 94
(restricting access to certain political canvassers by the landlord or
his servant or agent); (d) section 95 (alteration of locking system by
the landlord or the tenant except by mutal consent); (e) section 104
(failing to post up conspicuously and maintain posted the legal name
of the landlord and his address for service and a copy of Part IV or a
summary thereof as prescribed by the regulations). Section 104 now
also applies to a landlord of a mobile park and to a landlord renting
more than one rented premises in the same building and retaining
possession of part of the building for use of all tenants in common; 89
and (f) section 107 (landlord must regain possession only through
resort to Part 10 and not through self-help). 90
In addition to the sections noted previously, contravention of
which can lead to penal sanctions, breaches of the following
sections have been created as offences: (a) section 86 (distraining in
default of payment of rent, the remedy of distress having been
abolished); (b) section 93 (entry of premises by the landlord, except
in cases there described); and (c) sections 111, 112, 113 (to be
described below).
It is most unlikely that a landlord's servant or agent who
contravenes the sections listed in section 108 would be guilty of an
offence. The sections do not refer specifically to servants and
agents, as does section 94. The definition section of the Act, which
defines "landlord", does not include in the definition servants or
agents.91 This could lead to difficulties where a servant or agent had
89. Section 104(2)
90. See supra at 697-98
91. Section 1(b). See In re Totem Tourist Court and Skaley, [1973] 3 O.R. 867
(D.C.J.). There remains the problem noted in Lamont, supra, note I at 5:
Part IV refers to tenancy agreements between landlords and tenants, and
therefore applies to the usual understanding of that relationship. However the
words "landlord" and "tenant" are defined in section 1(b) and (e) and include
other persons permitting and enjoying occupation. Just who is otherwise
included is difficult to say, as the Courts have stuck to a narrow interpretation of
the application of the Act to landlords and tenants.
In the case of R. v. Poulin, [1973] 2 O.R. 875; 12 C.C.C. (2d) 49 (Prov. Ct,), the
judge (at 876; 12 C.C.C. (2d) at 49) concluded that the Act does not cover an
occupant who is a roomer in a rooming house.
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done something which would have amounted to a breach of a
prohibition contained in a section of the Act, if he was a landlord,
and the action had not been expressly or impliedly sanctioned by the
landlord. A case could arise where the landlord would escape
conviction, because he did not contravene the section "knowingly"
and his servant or agent, who had carried out the complained of
conduct, could not be found guilty of the offence.
5. Mobile Home Parks
The subject of mobile homes has been dealt with specifically by the
amendments to the Act 9 2 and the term "residential premises" has
been expanded to include "land intended and used as a site for a
mobile home used for residential purposes, whether or not the
landlord also supplies the mobile home". 9 3 Section 111 (1) provides
that: "subject to subsections 2 and 3, a tenant has the right to sell,
lease, or otherwise part with the possession of his mobile home
while it is situated within a mobile home park". The exceptions
referred to apply to (a) tenants of "premises administered by or for
the Government of Canada or Ontario or a municipality or any
agency thereof", 94 (As the Crown has not been made subject to the
provisions of the Act, it was unnecessary to relieve it from the
I feel that the word "occupant" as used in s. 1(e) includes persons in premises
that are occupied by other people or by some other persons in the relationship of
landlord and tenant.
The recent amendments do not appear to have changed the law and it would seem to
still be possible to create relations outside the Act, such as roomers and licensees of
residential premises.
In the case of Re PajelleInvestments Ltd. and Booth (1975), 60.R. (2d) 181 (Div.
Ct.), the Court did refer to the fact that the definition of landlord in section 1(b) is
inclusive rather than exclusive and that section 3 of the Act describes a "much
broader view of the landlord and tenant relationship . . ." (at 183). However, the
Court did not alter the established rule that there must be a landlord and tenant
relationship for the proceedings under the Act to be available.
This still leaves open the question of how broad a view of the landlord-tenant
relationship may be taken because section 3 of the Act states that the relationship
"does not depend on tenure" and because section 1(b) provides that "landlord"
includes not only lessor and owner but the "person giving or permitting the
occupation of the premises. . ".
If the legislature wished to include such persons as licensees and lodgers it would
have been desirable to have done so specifically rather than by possible inference.
92. Sections II 1-114
93. Section I(c) (ii)
94. Section 111(2)
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application of any provisions of the Act) 95 and (b) the right of a
landlord to provide in a tenancy agreement that the "right of a
tenant to sell, lease, or otherwise part with possession of his mobile
home while it is situated in a mobile park is subject to the consent of
the landlord, and, where it is so provided, such consent shall not be
arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld",96 The landlord is only
permitted to charge reasonable expenses incurred thereby. 9 7 In case
of any question arising concerning the disposal of the mobile home
by the tenant, as described in section 111(3) or (4), a summary
application may be made by either of them to the County or District
Court Judge of the county or district in which the premises are
situated. 98
Section 111(6) limits the right of a landlord to act as the tenant's
agent in any negotiations to sell, lease, or otherwise part with
possession of a mobile home except pursuant to a written agency
contract. Such a provision would not prevent the landlord from
obtaining a "written agency contract'! which might include
provision for sale of the mobile home, as agent of the tenant, to
cover arrears of rent.
Section 112 endeavours to limit the landlord's ability to make
charges except with respect to the rent for the land occupied and for
such services as electricity, gas and water furnished. By the terms of
the latter section only reasonable expenses can be charged for:
(a) the entry of a mobile home into a mobile home park;
(b) the exit of a mobile home from a mobile home park;
(c) the installation of a mobile home in a mobile home park;
(d) the removal of a mobile home from a mobile home park; or
(e) the granting of a tenancy in a mobile home park.
Section 113(l) prohibits the landlord of a mobile home park from
restricting a tenant's freedom "to purchase goods or services from
the person of his choice". However, section 113(3) permits the
landlord to restrict or prohibit entry of tradesmen into the mobile
home park where the tradesman has:
(a) unduly disturbed the peace and quiet of the mobile home park;
(b) failed to observe such reasonable rules of conduct as have
been established by the landlord; or
95.
96.
97.
98.

Supra, note 43
Section I 11 (3)
Section 111(4)
Section 111(5)
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(c) violated the traffic rules of the mobile home park.
With the growth of mobile home parks, the need for controlling
and regulating their management and operation became apparent.
Section 114 of the Act endeavours to impose on the landlord several
obligations concerning: removal of garbage, maintenance of roads,
snow removal, maintenance of essential services, maintenance of
grounds, structures, enclosures and equipment intended for the
common use of tenants and the repair of damage to tenants' property
caused by wilful or negligent conduct of the landlord.
A tenant in a mobile home park is responsible "for ordinary
cleanliness of the rented premises..." 99
It is apparent that the obligations imposed by sections 114 (1) (f)
and (2) are adaptations of similar obligations imposed with respect
to residential tenancies, other than for space in mobile home
parks. 10 0 Similarily, section 114(3) endeavours to create a summary
means of enforcing the obligations created by section 114, as was
created in the case of section 96(3).
6. Notice ofRent Increases
The amount of rent which may be charged by landlords in Ontario is
subject to review under The Residential PremisesRent Review Act,
1975.101 It is not intended to consider the latter Act in any detail in
this paper, except to note that it subjects certain tenancy agreements
to statutory guidelines which limit the size of rent increases during
the periods prescribed in the Act, subject to certain provisions for
higher increases being the result of mutual agreement of the parties
or the decision of a rent review officer. Section 20 of the latter Act
provides for its repeal on the first day of August, 1977.
It is imperative, during the period in which the latter Act is in
force, that a landlord who desires to obtain an increase in rent from
a rent review officer, in addition to complying with the
requirements of the latter Act, serves the notice provided for by
section 115 (1)of the Act:
A landlord shall not increase the rent for residential premises
unless he serves on the tenant a notice in writing setting out his
intention to increase the rent and the amount of the increase
99. Section 114(2)
100. Section 96(1) and section 96(2)
101. S.O. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 2, as amended by S.O. 1976, c. 2 and 36,
hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Review Act"
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intended to be made not less than ninety days prior to the end of,
(a) the period of the tenancy; or
(b) the term of a tenancy for a fixed period.
Section 115 (4) provides:
Subject to the provisions of The Residential Premises Rent
Review Act, 1975 (2nd Session), an increase in rent by the
landlord where the landlord has not served a notice according to
the provisions of subsection 1 is void.
The Ontario Divisional Court has held that failure to comply with
for an increase in rent provided
section 115(1) voids an application
10 2
for by the Rent Review Act.
When the Rent Review Act ceases to be in force, a tenant who
receives notice under section 115(1) must give proper notice of
termination (as specified therein) to his landlord or "he shall be
deemed to have accepted" the increases in the amount specified in
the notice, or such increases as "may be agreed upon in writing
"

103

Unless tenants are aware of their obligations under section 115(2)
many of them will become "locked in" unwittingly to leases at
increased rents. The apparent frustration of Ontario landlords with
the Rent Review Act makes it highly probable that the demise of rent
review will lead to the phenomenon of a landlords' "catch-up". It
would have added only slightly to a landlord's burden under section
115(1) to require inclusion in the notice of a warning that the
provisions of section 115(2) apply in the event that the required
notice of termination is not given.
However, until the Rent Review Act ceases to be in force, the
tenant will be able to rely on the review provided for under the latter
Act, and the "deemed acceptance by a tenant of an increase [in such
a case] does not consitute a waiver of the tenant's right to take
whatever proceedings are available to him under any law in force
that provides for the review of rent increases". 104
III. Conclusion
When the Rent Review Act ceases to be in force, if it is a not
succeeded by some form of legislation which serves a similar
purpose, the security of tenure provided for by the amended Act
102. Devitt v. Sawchyn (D.C.), not yet reported
103. Section 115(2)
104. Section 115(3)
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may not be sufficient to provide more than paper protection. If the
present extreme reduction in building starts of rental residential
property is not a temporary phenomenon, the government will be
faced with a number of unpleasant alternatives: it may refrain from
renewing rent review and risk a hostile tenant response at what may
be considered unwarranted rent increases. Or it could continue rent
review, and face a hostile response from young people finding a
shortage of rental accommodation and from landlords who may
further reduce their commitment to rental development. It may be
possible to retain reasonable security of tenure, even after the end of
the Rent Review Act, if some means can be developed for
identifying retaliatory rent increases.
As has been suggested, even if a means can be found for
safeguarding security of tenure (by insuring that it is not destroyed
by permitting retaliatory rent increases) it will still be necessary to
remedy a number of deficiencies in the Act:
1. Landlords must be assured that they will not suffer lengthy delays
in obtaining and enforcing a writ of possession when they are
legally entitled to possession. One month from the date of
commencement of proceedings would be fair to landlords, who can
obtain some protection by requiring a rent security deposit.
Hardship cases ought not to be the responsibility of the landlord,
unless he is to be reimbursed for assuming the burden. It is the
responsibility of the state to assist tenants who are experiencing
hardship, and not that of the landlord or other tenants. If landlords'
organizations could document their case adequately that they
experience lengthy delays in recovering possession, even where
they act promptly, they will have a stronger case for legislative
redress or for an examination of the ways in which judges or
sheriff's officers may be responsible for the delay in the
enforcement of landlords' remedies.
2. For security of tenure to be truly meaningful, it will be necessary
to overcome problems encountered in the procedures established by
the Act. While some improvement may be afforded by certain of the
amendments, there is reason to consider the establishment of a
landlord-tenant tribunal which would hold sittings at night, as well
as during the day. 10 5 Hearing dates should be flexible so as to
105. By merely changing the forum for settlement of landlord and tenant disputes
it is unlikely that significant improvement can be expected to occur in the
enforcement of the rights and obligations contained in the Act. The forum must also
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accommodate the needs of the parties. Ad hoc judges (or chairmen if
representatives of the parties of interest are to form part of the
tribunal) might be appointed from members of the bar. The tribunal
might make greater use of on site inspection in such cases where a
view would assist determination. Reports of experts appointed by
the judge (e.g., plumbers, carpenters, etc.) would reduce the
problems associated with proof which have been described above.
3. Provision must be made for obtaining injunctive relief in a
summary manner, and without the necessity for proceeding with a
court action.
Certainly, the concept of security of tenure is a necessary one if
tenants are to maintain a degree of dignity where they live, which
was not always possible where the tenancy might be terminated for
capricious reasons and where other arbitrary powers were possessed
by landlords. At the same time, the law will be judged seriously
deficient by landlords, unless they can be assured that they will be
able to recover possession for just cause without unwarranted
delays.
Although the new changes in the Act represent a bold attempt to
introduce meaningful security for tenants, they leave many doubts
concerning whether true security of tenure will be possible in
practice and whether landlords will be made any more secure in
relation to their fundamental rights.
provide for new machinery dedicated to treating the kinds of problems here
discussed. There must be an adequate, well-trained staff to serve provincial needs,
and the staff must be sufficiently trained in the law which they will be dealing with
as well as in the techniques of mediation and conciliation. As well, legal advisers
must be available to the staff members. For a discussion of the Manitoba
Rentalsman, see M. R. Gorsky, An Examination and Assessment of the
Amendments to the Landlord and Tenant Act (Part1), supra, note 56 and Part II
(1973), 5 Man. L.J. 270

